Simulation of Aircraft Sortie Generation under an Autonomic Logistics System by Bingol, Gunduz
Air Force Institute of Technology
AFIT Scholar
Theses and Dissertations Student Graduate Works
12-1-2016
Simulation of Aircraft Sortie Generation under an
Autonomic Logistics System
Gunduz Bingol
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.afit.edu/etd
Part of the Management and Operations Commons
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Graduate Works at AFIT Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and
Dissertations by an authorized administrator of AFIT Scholar. For more information, please contact richard.mansfield@afit.edu.
Recommended Citation
Bingol, Gunduz, "Simulation of Aircraft Sortie Generation under an Autonomic Logistics System" (2016). Theses and Dissertations.
498.
https://scholar.afit.edu/etd/498
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SIMULATION OF AIRCRAFT SORTIE GENERATION UNDER AN 
AUTONOMIC LOGISTICS SYSTEM 
 
THESIS 
 
Gunduz Bingol, First Lieutenant, TURAF 
 
AFIT-ENS-MS-16-D-052 
 
 
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE 
AIR UNIVERSITY 
AIR FORCE INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY 
  
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio 
 
DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; 
DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official 
policy or position of the United States Air Force, Department of Defense, the United 
States Government, Turkish Air Force, Republic of Turkey Ministry of National Defense, 
or the Republic of Turkey Government. 
 
AFIT-ENS-MS-16-D-052 
 
 
 
SIMULATION OF AIRCRAFT SORTIE GENERATION UNDER AN 
AUTONOMIC LOGISTICS SYSTEM 
 
 
 
THESIS 
 
 
 
Presented to the Faculty 
 
Department of Operational Sciences 
 
Graduate School of Engineering and Management 
 
Air Force Institute of Technology 
 
Air University 
 
Air Education and Training Command 
 
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the 
 
Degree of Master of Science in Logistics & Supply Chain Management 
 
 
 
 
Gunduz Bingol 
 
First Lieutenant, TURAF 
 
December 2016 
 
DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; 
DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED. 
 
 
 
  
AFIT-ENS-MS-16-D-052 
 
 
 
SIMULATION OF AIRCRAFT SORTIE GENERATION UNDER AN 
AUTONOMIC LOGISTICS SYSTEM 
 
 
THESIS 
 
 
 
Gunduz Bingol, BS 
First Lieutenant, TURAF 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Committee Membership: 
 
 
 
Dr. Alan W. Johnson 
Chair 
 
 
 
Dr. J. O. Miller 
(Member) 
AFIT-ENS-MS-16-D-052 
Abstract 
Rapidly-changing wartime environments and newly emerging global threats 
necessitate a highly responsive air power. This responsive air power is directly related to 
the success of Air Force logistics systems in generating sufficient sorties required for 
military operations. Briefly, the more efficient the logistic system is, the more powerful 
the Air Force is.  
Parallel to the developments in diagnostic and prognostic technology, autonomic 
logistics systems (ALS) represent a potential improvement for the aircraft sortie 
generation process.  Currently, Lockheed Martin and the Joint Program Office are 
developing a new autonomic logistics system for the multibillion F-35 Lightning 
Joint Strike Fighter project, which is named the "Autonomic Logistics Information 
System (ALIS).’’ 
Generally, researchers make an analogy between the ALS and the human body’s 
autonomic nervous system since both of them monitor, control, and adjust autonomic 
responses to external stimuli. Based on this perspective, ALS aims to switch the Air 
Force logistics mentality from a reactive one into a proactive one to achieve higher sortie 
generation rates and aircraft availability. 
The primary objective of this thesis is to explore the ALS concept in detail and to 
investigate the F-35’s sortie generation process through a discrete-event simulation model 
developed in Arena® Simulation Software. 
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SIMULATION OF AIRCRAFT SORTIE GENERATION UNDER AN 
AUTONOMIC LOGISTICS SYSTEM 
 
I.  Introduction 
Currently, Turkey has the second greatest armed forces in NATO, and the Turkish 
Air Force (TURAF) is the most deterrent and destructive element of this large force. 
TURAF defines its vision as; 
To become an aviation and aerospace power competing with the age, which keeps 
basic values of the Turkish Air Force alive, trains highly-educated aviator 
manpower, adopts a contemporary management approach, possesses high 
technology and utilizes it efficiently, ensures deterrence against all kinds of 
threats in its region, is capable of conducting uninterrupted 
separate/joint/combined operations anywhere required by national interests and 
strengthens its superiority through national defense industry (Turkish Air Force, 
2016).  
TURAF has gone through many transitions since its foundation in 1911 to fulfill 
its goal of possessing high technology and utilizing it efficiently. In particular, the 
acquisition of F-16 Fighting Falcon Combat Aircraft in 1987 is assumed to be the most 
remarkable of those transitions. 
On July 11, 2002, when Turkey decided to join as the seventh international 
partner in the F-35 Project, another important technology transition process was initiated 
for TURAF. Presently, Turkey is planning to procure 100 F-35s, and the first delivery 
(two aircraft) will be made in 2018 (Undersecretariat of Defense Industries, 2016).  
The F-35’s unsurpassed technological systems and unique stealth capabilities 
ensure that it will be the future of Turkish national security for decades to come. It will 
both introduce a new operational concept and lead a logistics innovation. Its cutting edge 
Autonomic Logistics System will switch TURAF’s logistics mentality from a reactive 
2 
one into a proactive one, which will enable higher sortie generation rates and aircraft 
availability in a more cost-efficient manner. 
This thesis develops a discrete-event simulation model of the F-35’s sortie 
generation process to provide decision makers with a better understanding of the 
Autonomic Logistics concept and its impact on the logistics and operational side 
by enabling "what-if" analysis. 
Background 
Rapidly-changing wartime environments and newly emerging global threats 
necessitate highly responsive air power using cutting-edge war technology. Parallel to 
this need, the F-35 project emerged in late 1995. According to the US Government 
Accountability Office, the F-35 is the most ambitious and expensive weapon system in 
DOD’s history, with $400 billion acquisition cost and $891 billion sustainment cost over 
its planned 56-year life cycle (Government Accountability Office, 2016).  
Responsiveness of an air power is directly related to the success of its logistics 
system in generating sufficient sorties required for military operations. The F-35 program 
developers recognized the Autonomic Logistics concept as the key element to a more 
efficient and proactive logistics system to make the F-35 a highly lethal, affordable, 
supportable, and survivable aircraft.  
Autonomic Logistics (AL) Concept 
The term “Autonomic Logistics” (AL) was coined to describe an essentially 
automatic set of processes to ensure maximum sortie generation with minimum logistics 
footprint and costs, while still maintaining high mission reliability (Henley, Currer, 
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Scheuren, Hess, & Goodman, 2000). It is an inevitable result of the high-technology 
diagnostic and prognostic applications in the field of equipment support. In particular, the 
successful implementation of an AL System in the F-35 fighter, Autonomic Logistics 
Information System (ALIS), marked the formation of AL mode. The AL system works 
much the same way as a human body’s autonomic nervous system. It monitors, controls, 
and adjusts autonomic responses to external stimuli. 
According to the AL concept, the signals coming from special sensors embedded 
on aircraft are examined and analyzed constantly for the entire sortie generation process, 
and fault detection, fault isolation, fault prediction and reporting are made automatically 
by the aircraft Prognostic and Health Management (PHM) system.  The logistics 
personnel from maintenance to supply are informed about the health status of the aircraft 
all the time. Therefore, when the aircraft lands, the right personnel, equipment, and 
material are at the right place at the right time, and performance parameters presumably 
improve significantly. 
Sortie Generation Process 
The main purpose of the AL concept is to improve the aircraft sortie generation 
process.  Sortie generation is a cyclic process of flight related activities and has been the 
same for many years (Faas, 2003). The aim of this process is to achieve a certain sortie 
generation rate (SGR), which is the number of flight missions carried out within a 
specific timeframe. SGR is a key factor of a military aircraft’s combat effectiveness and 
also seen as an important metric for senior commanders to evaluate readiness of an air 
force to apply airpower (Guoqing, Hongzhao, & Yuanhui, 2010). 
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Literature reviews indicate that there is not a unanimous approach regarding the 
starting point of the sortie generation cycle or the steps within the cycle. However, it is 
widely accepted that sortie generation is a combination of inspection, service, flight, and 
maintenance operations (Aykiri, 2016; Faas, 2003; Guoqing et al., 2010; Rebulanan, 
2000; Rossetti & McGee, 2006). In this thesis, sortie generation activities are gathered 
under four groups as pre-flight operations, sortie, post-flight operations, and maintenance 
operations. Pre-flight operations are assumed as the first stage of the sortie generation 
process. Figure 1 represents the entire sortie generation process with a different colored 
background for each main group.  
 
Figure 1. Sortie Generation Process (Partially adapted from (Faas, 2003)) 
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• Pre-flight operations: When a flight mission is planned, the aircraft is refueled 
and some servicing (oil, tire, fluid check etc.) is applied if needed. Then, mission 
specified weapons and pods are installed onto the aircraft. Since pre-flight 
operations are standardized actions, their completion times do not vary 
significantly from their average.  
• Sortie: Following the pre-flight inspection the engine is started and the aircraft 
begins taxiing onto the runway. Then it takes off, executes the planned mission, 
and comes back for landing. A sortie’s duration depends on the type of the 
mission. For the same mission type, usually it does not vary from its average. 
Expert views and literature reviews indicate that most of the component failures 
occur in this phase. 
• Post-flight operations: Following the landing, the aircraft is moved to the 
parking location and munitions are downloaded. While the aircrew conducts their 
debriefing to the maintenance crew, concurrently some basic post-flight 
operations (BPO) are applied to check the aircraft health status.  If there is no 
fault found during the BPO, the aircraft is routed to the aircraft pool for the next 
mission. If any fault is found, an appropriate maintenance process is initiated to 
fix the problem.   
• Maintenance operations: There are three types of maintenance applied to the 
aircraft: 1) Unscheduled maintenance; 2) Scheduled maintenance; 3) Depot level 
maintenance. Unscheduled maintenance is conducted to fix the unexpected 
failures occurring in any step of the sortie generation process. Scheduled 
maintenance (preventive maintenance) is applied to change the time-sensitive 
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components which reach a predetermined flight hour-limit, no matter if there is a 
malfunction or not. While unscheduled maintenance may last for several hours, 
scheduled maintenance can take a couple of days. Depot level maintenance is also 
executed based on the accumulated flight hours. Some modifications programs 
are applied to bring the currently fielded aircraft to their expected airframe 
structural lifespan and usually require several months (The Office of The 
Director, 2015). Figure 2 briefly represents the maintenance process flow. 
 
Figure 2. The Flow of Unscheduled and Scheduled Maintenance (Adapted from Faas, 2003) 
 
Literature reviews indicates that an ALS is expected to make the most significant 
contribution to the maintenance operations by introducing a proactive approach over the 
reactive approach used today. Therefore, the main focus of our simulation model is the 
maintenance processes portion of the sortie generation cycle, with particular emphasis on 
unscheduled maintenance.  Impacts of ALS on maintenance operations are explained in 
detail in the following chapters. 
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Previous Work 
Due to its great value to a military force in terms of cost, sortie generation, and 
aircraft availability, the Autonomic Logistics System (ALS) has become a popular 
subject of scientific research. An increasing number of simulations and analytical studies 
are being conducted to analyze the AL in depth. Literature reviews showed that some 
pioneering simulation studies regarding the ALS and sortie generation process were 
conducted by former AFIT students.  
While Rebulanan (2000) and Malley (2001) used an object-oriented design with 
JAVA® and Silk® programming languages, Yager (2003) built a closed queuing model 
and Faas (2003) developed a discrete event simulation model with Arena® software to 
investigate the possible impacts of the ALS on the sortie generation process. 
These studies were conducted in the early 2000s, a time when the F-35 project 
and ALS were in their infancy, and mainly investigated ALS from a conceptual 
perspective. Researchers were unable to use real F-35 data due to the fact that a working 
system didn’t exist, and none of them included Learning Curves (LCs) and reliability 
growth concepts. Therefore, this research attempts to fill that gap in the scientific field by 
building a simulation model based as much as possible on actual F-35 data. Moreover, 
LCs and reliability growth are included into the model logic to obtain more realistic 
outputs. 
Problem Statement 
Although F-35 aircraft will be the main TURAF combat element in the near 
future, its logistics properties and capabilities are not well known. Decision makers and 
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planners within the TURAF need to recognize and appreciate the potential impacts of the 
AL concept to manage F-35 fleet more effectively and efficiently.  
Purpose Statement 
In this study, the ALS is investigated in detail and a discrete-event simulation 
model for the F-35 sortie generation process is developed using Arena® Simulation 
Software. After collecting the data from the simulation model, statistical analyses are 
performed through JMP® Software in designed experiments to determine the ALS’s 
impacts on the measures of performance (MOPs) of the F-35’s sortie generation process. 
Research Objectives and Questions 
The Sortie generation process includes many parameters, which makes it 
extremely difficult to exhaustively analyze. Therefore, the main objective of this research 
is to provide a useful simulation model for decision makers to recognize the key factors 
within the ALS and their potential impacts on MOPs of the F-35’s sortie generation 
process. The following questions capture the main focus of our research: 
1. What impact does the maturity level of the PHM system have on the MOPs of the 
F-35’s sortie generation process? 
 
2. What impact do learning curves have on the MOPs of the F-35’s sortie generation 
process? 
 
3. What impact does reliability growth have on the MOPs of the F-35’s sortie 
generation process? 
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Scope and Assumptions 
Presently, there are three variants of the F-35. This research specifically 
investigates the sortie generation process of the conventional F-35 variant, the F-35A, 
since it is the only variant that will be procured by Turkey.  
Additionally, the F-35 aircraft is a very complex system consisting of many 
subsystems, and its availability is directly dependent on the functionality of all those 
subsystems. However, modelling a sortie generation process with all those subsystems 
would be too complicated and time consuming, since each of them might have different 
failure rates and repair times. Therefore, for simplicity, the scope of this research is 
limited to only mission critical failures encountered by the F-35A variant. No LRC (Line 
Replaceable Component) specification is made and all LRCs are assumed to have similar 
failure rates and repair times. Moreover, only diagnostic capability of the F-35 is 
modeled, since prognostic capability is not yet functional. 
Summary 
This chapter described the rationale behind the research with regards to the F-35 
project, Autonomic Logistics, and aircraft sortie generation, and provided an overview of 
the problem statement, purpose statement, research objective, research questions, scope, 
and assumptions. Chapter II presents reviews of the existing literature on the sortie 
generation process. Chapter III describes the data used to meet the research objectives, as 
well as the data analysis and model development. Chapter IV provides results of the 
research, while Chapter V provides conclusions and recommendations for further 
research. 
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II. Literature Review 
Introduction 
This chapter examines prior researches conducted in the area of the sortie 
generation process, Autonomic Logistics, and Learning Curves. Also, the F-35 project is 
discussed from a logistics basis. Furthermore, the present situation of the F-35’s 
Autonomic Logistics Information System is put forward in the view of official reports 
presented by the United States Government Accountability Office (GAO).    
Sortie Generation Process 
As described in Chapter 1, sortie generation is a combination of many activities 
dedicated to produce desired number of sorties within a limited time period. Due to its 
paramount importance for an air force’s combat effectiveness and deterrence, sortie 
generation has been a popular subject of scientific research for many years. Some key 
studies conducted in this field are presented below.  
Guoqing et al. (2010) developed an approximate analytical method producing 
highly similar results to those obtained from long simulations. Their study showed that 
sortie generation rate was the key parameter for a military aircraft’s combat effectiveness. 
MacKenzie et al. (2012) also examined the relationship between the number of 
sorties flown and Combat Mission Readiness (CMR). They assumed CMR was a key 
metric for senior commanders to evaluate readiness of an air force to apply air power. 
They demonstrated that different mixes of maintenance personnel skill levels 
significantly affect the sortie generation rate.  
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Iwata and Mavris (2013) focused on supply activities within the sortie generation 
process. They put forward the relationship between mission capable (MC) rate and 
average part delivery time by conducting a case study using a Python simulation tool. 
They showed that MC rate began to decrease after the delivery time grew beyond 1.0 
day, and flattened off at a MC rate of 0.7 from 1.4 to 1.9 days. After that point, MC rate 
fell rapidly.  
Harris (2002) noted that the Logistics Composite Model (LCOM), currently being 
used by USAF to calculate sortie rates, requires a great amount of input data and 
processing time. Therefore, LCOM hinders the commander’s flexibility, responsiveness, 
and ability to create alternative options. Thus, he proposed the Sortie Generation Rate 
(SGR) model which was a generic sortie model with simple operational input and quick 
turnaround. The SGR model generated sortie rates that were close to the actual sortie 
rates. 
Lastly, Manuel D. Rossetti and Joshua B. McGee (2006) demonstrated that 
simulation could provide valuable information for decision-making at the unit level and 
provide much needed assistance in the generation and execution of a weekly flying 
schedule. Thus, their model allowed the unit level logistics planners to compare 
alternative schedules and perform what-if analysis. 
Literature reviews show that the impacts of the Autonomic Logistics (AL) on 
sortie generation process became another focus topic for researchers when the F-35 
project was introduced in mid-1990. Some pioneering simulation studies in this area were 
conducted by AFIT graduates. 
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First, Rebulanan (2000) created a computer simulation model of the ALS, called 
ALSim, using object-oriented design with Java and Silk programming languages to 
compare the ALS with the existing logistics system. His study indicated that the ALS 
could improve the system performance in terms of aircraft availability, sortie generation 
rate, and time waiting for parts. Following Rebulanan’s study, Malley (2001) added the 
reality of false alarms into Rebulanan’s ALSim to generate more realistic failure 
detection times in order to make the simulation more useful for decision making. 
Next, Faas (2003) built a discrete event simulation model of sortie generation 
with Arena® software to investigate the ALS concept. His model also indicated that the 
ALS equipped aircraft could perform more effectively than a non-ALS aircraft up to a 
point. In the best case scenario, in which false alarms were at a minimum level, there was 
an 8% improvement in Mission Capable rate. At the other factor-level combinations, the 
ALS performed marginally better or even worse than the non-ALS aircraft. 
Cassady et al. (2006) developed a simulation model with Arena to explore the 
impacts of diagnostic and prognostic errors on fleet performance and compare prognostic 
to scheduled maintenance. Focusing on type-1 and type-2 errors, they showed that 
prognostics could be an effective tool in some cases (even in the presence of significant 
prognostic errors) and a very ineffective tool in other cases. In some cases, prognostic 
errors could make a situation worse than a "run to failure” policy (unscheduled 
maintenance) would do. 
To sum up, the literature reviews demonstrated that simulation is a useful tool to 
investigate aircraft sortie generation processes. Moreover, sortie generation rate and 
aircraft availability are the two most commonly used sortie generation performance 
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parameters. However, none of the studies used real-world F-35 data. They mostly 
investigated sortie generation from a theoretical basis. Therefore, developing a simulation 
model based on real-world F-35 data may provide significant contributions to this 
research area.  
The F-35 Project 
The second topic investigated through the literature reviews was the F-35 project. 
According to the GAO reports, the F-35 is the most ambitious and expensive weapon 
system in DOD’s history with sustainment costs comprising the vast majority of DOD’s 
$1.3 trillion cost estimate. It is a joint, multinational acquisition intended to develop and 
field a family of next-generation strike fighter aircraft for the United States Air Force, 
Navy, and Marine Corps, and eight international partners (United Kingdom, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Turkey, Canada, Australia, Denmark, and Norway). Lockheed Martin is the 
primary aircraft contractor and Pratt & Whitney is the engine contractor (Government 
Accountability Office, 2016).  
The F-35 project is currently in the low-rate production stage with full-rate 
production planned to start by 2019. The timeline of major events in the F-35 program is 
presented in Table 1. 
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Table 1. Timeline of Major Events in the F-35 Program (Government Accountability Office, 2014) 
 
 
According to the DOD, there will be three variants of the F-35: 
• The conventional takeoff and landing (CTOL) variant, designated the F-35A, 
is a multirole, stealthy strike aircraft replacement for the Air Force’s F-16 Falcon 
and the A-10 Thunderbolt II aircraft, and complements the F-22A Raptor. Turkey 
will procure the CTOL variant. 
• The short takeoff and vertical landing (STOVL) variant, designated the F-
35B, is a multirole, stealthy strike fighter that replaces the Marine Corps’ F/A-
18C/D Hornet and AV-8B Harrier aircraft. 
• The carrier-suitable variant (CV), designated the F-35C provides the Navy a 
multirole, stealthy strike aircraft to complement the F/A-18. 
McCollom and Worth (2011) state that the F-35 aircraft vision rests on four main 
pillars: Affordability, Lethality, Supportability, and Survivability (see Figure 3). The 
program has a unique commitment to the creation of a new form of aircraft and 
operational systems, with a fundamental and essential focus on two of the four program 
‘‘pillars’’- Supportability and Affordability. 
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Figure 3. F-35 Aircraft Vision (McCollom, 2011) 
 
The supportability and affordability of the F-35 are directly related to the 
sustainment costs, since they are the most significant cost driver of the F-35 program. 
The sustainment costs consist of Operation and Support (O&S) costs incurred from the 
initial system deployment through the end of system operations, and include all costs of 
operating, maintaining, and supporting the fielded system. The F-35 program office 
develops an annual estimate for the O&S costs of maintaining and supporting the F-35 
for 56 years. In its most recent estimate (2014), the program office estimates cost at about 
$891 billion to sustain the entire F-35 fleet over its life cycle (Government 
Accountability Office, 2016). 
These financial estimates related to the F-35’s sustainment highlight the 
importance of a new logistics system that should be far more efficient than the legacy 
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logistics systems. The F-35 program developers recognize the Autonomic Logistics 
concept as the key element to a more efficient logistics system which will make the F-35 
a highly lethal and affordable aircraft. 
Autonomic Logistics (AL) Concept 
The AL concept is the inevitable result of high-tech diagnostic and prognostic 
advances in the field of equipment support. It aims to achieve condition-based 
maintenance by using the health status data coming from special sensors embedded onto 
the aircraft.  
The AL concept has four major parts: 1) Prognostics and Health Management 
(PHM); 2) Joint Distributed Information System (JDIS); 3) Technology-enabled 
maintainer; 4) Responsive logistics infrastructure (Henley et al., 2000). 
PHM is a kind of on-board artificial autonomic nervous system which is vital for 
AL operations. Through the use of intelligent reasoners, PHM detects, isolates, and 
predicts failures or triggers a single maintenance action in the event of unpredicted failure 
(Henley et al., 2000). Henley et al. defined key benefits of PHM as:  
• Improved safety,  
• Improved sortie generation,  
• Triggering of AL functions,  
• Reduced life cycle costs,  
• Reduced logistics footprint,  
• Triggering of system reconfiguration to achieve mission reliability, 
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• Providing advanced onboard diagnostics and testability to reduce the skillset 
needed by maintainers.  
JDIS is an advanced information technology providing decision support tools and 
an effective communication network linking aircraft with the logistics infrastructure to 
provide proactive support and enable remote maintenance when needed. The information 
fusion capability of the PHM system allows JDIS to output and pass on actions and 
recommendations rather than just data (Hess, Calvello, & Dabney, 2004). By fusing the 
information coming from sensors, it produces the following outputs: 
• Maintenance Information/knowledge, 
• Supply chain management information, 
• Health and usage information, 
• Forecast aircraft availability data, 
• Best use of resource recommendations, 
• Training Management (Henley et al., 2000). 
With the help of the outputs above, the following tasks are automatically 
performed through JDIS: Mission planning, maintenance action scheduling, ordering of 
spare parts, scheduling of flight and maintenance training, assignment of specific pilots to 
specific missions based upon experience and readiness, assigning specific aircraft to 
specific missions based upon aircraft availability and capability, and storing maintenance, 
training, spare part, and logistic information in the data warehouse (Hess et al., 2004). 
The maintainer in the AL concept is enabled with a full set of technological tools 
to prepare the aircraft for its next sortie in the most effective way. The maintainer’s 
toolset consists of: 
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• Comprehensive knowledge of the actual aircraft health before beginning work, 
• Appropriate and timely training to conduct the task, 
• All the necessary material on hand before commencement of work, 
• Interactive guidance available in real time to provide supplementary information 
as required (Henley et al., 2000). 
A technologically enabled maintainer is capable of efficiently and effectively 
maintaining the F-35 with less specialized training and more “on the spot” training. This 
allows the use of fewer maintainers, cross trained over many sub-systems (Hess et al., 
2004). 
Finally, a flexible and responsive logistics infrastructure is needed to get full 
benefit from the substantial PHM capability, technologically enabled maintainer, and 
highly capable JDIS. 
Autonomic Logistics Information System (ALIS) 
The F-35 program developers recognize the AL concept as the key enabler to a 
highly supportable and affordable fighter. The AL implementation in the F-35 fighter 
aircraft is named  the “Autonomic Logistics Information System’’ (ALIS), which was 
also called the Joint Distributed Information System (JDIS) by many previous 
researchers. ALIS is one of three major components that make up the F-35 air system, 
along with the aircraft and the engine, and comprises both hardware and software 
(Government Accountability Office, 2014).  
Lockheed Martin, the prime contractor of the F-35 project, describes ALIS in its 
official website as: “ALIS serves as the information infrastructure for the F-35, 
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transmitting aircraft health and maintenance action information to the appropriate users 
on a globally-distributed network to technicians worldwide. ALIS receives Health 
Reporting Codes via a radio frequency downlink while the F-35 is still in flight; this 
enables the pre-positioning of parts and qualified maintainers so that when the aircraft 
lands, downtime is minimized and efficiency is increased.” (Lockheed Martin, 2016). 
ALIS has three main hardware components:  
• The Autonomic Logistics Operating Unit (ALOU): The ALOU is the computer 
server that all F-35 data ultimately are sent through and it supports 
communications with and between the government and the contractor’s systems. 
• The Central Point of Entry (CPE): The CPE is configured to provide software 
and data distribution for the entire F-35 fleet in the United States, enables 
interoperability with national (government) systems at the country level, and 
enables ALIS data connectivity between bases. Each international partner 
operating F-35 aircraft is expected to have its own CPE at other locations. 
• The Standard Operating Unit (SOU): SOUs provide all ALIS capabilities to 
support flying, maintenance, and training. They also provide access to 
applications to operate and sustain the aircraft (Government Accountability 
Office, 2016). 
General architecture and primary applications of the ALIS are presented in Table 
2. According to F-35 Program Office’s assessment of functionality status as of January 
2016, green applications (JTD, LOHAS) have no issues, yellow applications (AVD/H, 
CMMS, MVI, Propulsion, SCM) have minor issues, and red applications (OMS, TMS) 
have major issues. 
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Table 2. Primary ALIS Applications and the F-35 Program Office’s Assessment of Their 
Functionality Status as of January (Government Accountability Office, 2016) 
 
 
DOD has estimated ALIS related total costs to be about $16.7 billion over the F-
35’s 56-year life cycle. However, a 2013 DOD commissioned plan found that schedule 
slippage and functionality problems with ALIS could lead to $20-100 billion in additional 
costs.  
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Table 3. Autonomic Logistics and Information System Costs (Government Accountability Office, 
2016) 
 
Maintenance Concepts and ALIS 
Faas (2003) defines maintenance as the heart of flight line operations due to its 
paramount importance in generating a desired number of sorties. It is one of the most 
significant cost drivers in aircraft sustainment. According to the DOD, maintenance costs 
hold almost 30 percent of the F-35’s sustainment costs (Government Accountability 
Office, 2014).  
Aircraft maintenance has evolved over time from a “fix it when it breaks” policy 
to a condition-based maintenance concept (Vandawaker, 2015). Table 4 presents a 
categorical breakdown of maintenance approaches and their attributes.  
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Table 4. Maintenance Concepts (Vandawaker, 2015) 
 
 
Maintenance Process within Legacy Logistics System 
In the current situation, legacy aircraft are supported by two types of 
maintenance: unscheduled maintenance and scheduled (preventive) maintenance. The 
ground crew is only notified of a fault either prior to landing if the pilot radios in or on 
the ground after engine shutdown (Faas, 2003). Fault diagnosis is mainly carried out 
during post flight servicing, inspection and aircrew briefing. Once the problem is 
diagnosed, required part/parts are ordered from supply. After the parts are received, 
unscheduled maintenance is conducted to fix the problem. Also, maintenance personnel 
must document the entire process.  
23 
Regarding preventive maintenance, Time Change Item (TCI) replacements are 
conducted based on accumulated flight hours of the critical parts, not based on part 
condition (Faas, 2003). Once a part reaches its limit of accumulated flight hours, it is 
replaced or repaired no matter if it is still functional or not.  
Maintenance Process within ALIS 
As stated  in  the "Autonomic  Logistics  Concept" section,  theoretically  many 
significant changes take place within the F-35 sortie generation process with a full-
functional Autonomic Logistics and Information System (ALIS).  Supposedly, ALIS 
provides the most considerable improvement on the maintenance step by substituting a 
proactive approach for the existing reactive approach.  
First of all, health status of the F-35 aircraft is monitored by ALIS for the entire 
sortie generation process. The signals coming from special sensors on the aircraft are 
fused via some reasoners and PHM data (including time, status of subsystems and other 
health related information) are transferred to the maintenance and supply units 
concurrently. Fault detection, fault isolation and documentation are done automatically. 
Therefore, maintainers are enabled to diagnose the failures more easily and quickly, and 
the amount of diagnostic equipment and time are reduced considerably. Since the right 
personnel, the right equipment, and the right part are ready at the right place at the right 
time, costs and delays of maintenance are minimized significantly.    
Second, prognostic capabilities of ALIS replace the existing preventive 
maintenance with condition-based maintenance. Therefore, the time-change items which 
are normally replaced according to predetermined flight hours in the preventive 
maintenance concept will be only replaced when they become non-functional. 
 24 
Additionally, ALIS provide maintainers with timely knowledge of impending 
failures. Therefore, opportunistic maintenance is possible by grouping multiple 
maintenance actions at a single time, while the aircraft is already down. For instance, a 
hypothetical aircraft is down for a routine engine wash. While it is being attended to, the 
prognostics system informs maintainers that the primary auxiliary power unit has begun 
to degrade and needs to be replaced within the next 15 flight hours. It also informs the 
maintainers that the oil in the engine is beginning to show signs of coking and has an 
undesirably high content of fragments. Hence, all three maintenance actions can be taken 
care of with a single downing of the aircraft, vice three separate maintenance actions 
which would keep the plane out of commission for some time (Hess & Fila, 2002). 
However, in practice, ALIS is far from providing all of the theoretical benefits 
mentioned above. According to some official reports prepared by Government 
Accountability Office and The Office of The Director, Operational Test and Evaluation 
(DOT&E), ALIS has experienced recurring problems, including user issues and schedule 
delays. The integration of ALIS capabilities—which are fielded in increments—has been 
repeatedly delayed. Additionally, ALIS’s prognostic capability still is not functional and 
its diagnostic system has not reached full functionality yet (Government Accountability 
Office, 2014; The Office of The Director, 2015). 
Action Request (AR) System within ALIS 
Currently, maintenance personnel track issues with ALIS through an internal 
reporting mechanism called the Action Request (AR) System, which allows users in the 
field to identify problems with the system for potential fixes (Government Accountability 
 25 
Office, 2014). Upon landing, a computer system is attached to the aircraft and gathers all 
the information needed to decide whether the aircraft has a maintenance issue or if it is 
ready to fly again. If there is a problem and a known fix is not available in the F-35’s 
Joint Technical Data (JTD), an Action Request (AR) is initiated by the maintenance 
personnel and sent to the Lockheed Martin engineers for tailored instructions to fix the 
discrepancy. After an appropriate resolution is reached, maintenance personnel fix the 
problem (Colbacchini, Gahafer, Mcevoy, & Park, 2016). Figure 4 represents the overall 
issue-resolution process. 
 
Figure 4. ALIS Issue-Resolution Process (Government Accountability Office, 2014) 
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The AR System aims to route and monitor ARs through the maintenance cycle 
efficiently. However, its current performance does not meet the desired level. Using 
Microsoft Excel’s YASAI add-in, Colbacchini et al. (2016) developed a discrete event 
simulation model to determine how to minimize the time in the AR system. They found 
that an AR for the most severe problems took an average of 17 days to navigate through 
the AR system, which did not meet the Air Force standards.  They concluded that 
maintenance personnel should increase training on the AR System and Lockheed Martin 
should hire more engineers to reduce the process time of ARs. A 2015 DOT&E report 
and a 2016 GAO report supported the findings of Colbacchini et al. by indicating that 
ALIS’s AR process is insufficient and problematic (Government Accountability Office, 
2016; The Office of The Director, 2015). 
The literature reviews showed that the AR system and its effects on the sortie 
generation process have not been thoroughly investigated.  Since it holds an important 
place within the F-35’s current maintenance activities and causes considerable delays, it 
is included in our simulation model in order to obtain more realistic results. 
Prognostic Health Management (PHM) within ALIS 
ALIS’s PHM system has three major components: fault and failure management 
(diagnostic capability), life and usage management (prognostic capability), and data 
management.  
According to a 2015 DOT&E report, the F-35’s PHM diagnostic and data 
management capabilities remain immature and the program does not yet plan to integrate 
prognostic capabilities. Diagnostic capabilities demonstrate poor accuracy, low detection 
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rates, and a high false alarm rate. Table 5 compares specific diagnostic measures from the 
Operational Requirements Document (ORD) with current values of performance through 
June 2015 (The Office of The Director, 2015). 
Table 5. Metrics of F-35's Diagnostic Capabilities 
 
 
Poor diagnostic performance increases maintenance downtime. Maintainers often 
conduct built-in tests to see if the fault codes detected by the diagnostics are true faults. 
False alarms lead to unnecessary maintenance actions. These actions increase 
maintenance man-hours per flight hour, which in turn can reduce aircraft availability 
rates and sortie generation rates. Poor accuracy of diagnostic tools can also lead to 
desensitizing maintenance personnel to actual faults (The Office of The Director, 2015). 
Because the F-35’s prognostic capability is not yet functional, only the diagnostic 
capability is modeled in this research. The data in Table 5 are used as the baseline values 
to model the diagnostic process within the sortie generation process.  
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Learning Curves and Reliability Growth 
Organizations and their workers tend to operate more efficiently over time, if they 
perform a task repetitively. Learning Curves (LCs) were originally proposed by Theodore 
Paul Wright in 1936 upon observing cost reductions due to repetitive procedures in 
aircraft production plants (Anzanello & Fogliatto, 2011). Figure 5 shows that it takes less 
cost or time to complete each additional unit as the number of repetitions (volume) 
increases.  
 
Figure 5. Learning Curve 
 
Since their first introduction, LCs have been widely applied to services and 
industry. LC effects within some major U.S. industries are presented in Table 6.  
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Table 6. Examples of Learning Curves Effects (Cunningham, 1980) 
 
 
Many approaches are used to model LCs mathematically. Generally, Wright’s 
model, which is also referred as the “Log-linear Model”, is viewed as the first formal LC 
model. It has the following mathematical representation: 
Equation 1 
y = T1xb     (1) 
Where: 
y = the average time (or cost) per unit demanded to produce 
x = the cumulative number of units produced 
T1 = the time (cost) to produce the first unit  
Parameter b = the slope of the LC which describes the workers’ learning rate.  
        = (log of the learning rate) / (log 2).  
Parameter b has values between -1 and 1. Values of b close to -1 denote high 
learning rate and fast adaptation to task execution (Anzanello & Fogliatto, 2011). 
According to the model, as the cumulative number of the output is doubled, the average 
time (cost) per unit decreases by b percent. 
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As stated in previous sections, the sortie generation process is a combination of 
multiple repetitive tasks.  Therefore, it is possible that the time required to perform these 
tasks may decrease as logistics personnel gain more experience after each flight mission. 
The 2015 DOT&E report notes that a learning curve effect is likely to improve the F-35’s 
repair times. As maintainers become more familiar with common failure modes, their 
ability to quickly repair them improves over time (The Office of The Director, 2015).  
Another important implication of the LCs is the reliability growth. Complex 
systems under development typically face high initial failure rates. However, over time a 
learning curve effect takes place as sources of failures are determined and eliminated. 
Therefore, the failure rates start to gradually decrease (Jewell, 1984).  
The Duane model is one of the most common reliability growth patterns 
experienced in practice (Larry H . Crow, 2011). DOD also uses the Duane model to 
investigate the reliability growth for aircraft.  Mean Flight Hours Between Unscheduled 
Maintenance (MHFBSME) growth rates  calculated by the DOD for several historical 
aircraft are shown in Table 7 (The Office of The Director, 2015). 
Table 7. Growth Rates for Several Historical Aircraft (The Office of The Director, 2015) 
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However, due to lack of the data to implement the Duane model, this research 
uses the Idealized Growth Curve Model which is  a simpler reliability growth model 
defined in the Military Handbook of Reliability Growth Management (United States 
Department of Defense, 1981).  
According to the Idealized Growth Curve Model, a reliability growth rate is 
calculated through the equation below.  
Equation 2 
𝛼𝛼 = 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 �𝑇𝑇
𝑡𝑡1
� − 1 + ��1 + 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 (𝑇𝑇
𝑡𝑡1
)�2 + 2𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 (𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹
𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖
)�0.5  (2) 
Where: 
α = Growth parameter 
T = Cumulative test time at the end of the test 
t1 = Length of initial test cycle in cumulative test time  
MF = Final Mean Time to Failure (MTTF) 
Mi = Initial MTTF 
The growth rate is a value between 0 and 1. Zero means no growth. As the growth 
rate increases, the failure rate decreases. Based on the growth rate calculated in Equation 
2, instantaneous MTTF is obtained from equation 3. 
Equation 3 
𝑀𝑀(𝑡𝑡) = � 𝑀𝑀1, 0 < 𝑡𝑡 < 𝑡𝑡1𝑀𝑀1(1−𝛼𝛼) ( 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡1)𝛼𝛼, 𝑡𝑡 ≥  𝑡𝑡1    (3) 
Where: 
M(t) = Instantaneous MTTF at time t 
t = Cumulative test time 
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M1 = Average MTTF at time t1 
t1 = Length of initial test cycle in cumulative test time 
α = Growth parameter 
Due to their potential impacts mentioned above, LCs and reliability growth 
concepts are addressed while developing the simulation model.  Necessary mathematical 
functions are embedded into the model accordingly. Thus, the model is able to produce 
more realistic outputs for the overall sortie generation process. Implementations of LCs 
and reliability growth are explained thoroughly in the methodology section.   
Conclusion 
The literature reviews indicated that many valuable studies were conducted to 
investigate the sortie generation process and the potential impacts of the AL system on 
the sortie generation MOPs. However, they mainly examined the AL system on a 
conceptual basis, since real world F-35 data was not yet available. Moreover, none of the 
researches incorporated possible impacts of the learning curves.  
Incorporating the learning curves and using the most recent real world data about 
the AL system, this research builds a discrete event simulation model of the F-35’s sortie 
generation processes in order to provide valuable information for decision makers. 
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III. Methodology 
Chapter Overview  
This chapter describes a discrete event simulation model of the F-35’s sortie 
generation process under the Autonomic Logistics (AL) system. The following sections 
cover data collection, definition of assumptions, modeling steps, and implementation of 
Learning Curves (LCs) and reliability growth concepts.   
Simulation in Arena 
Sortie generation is a very complicated process with many sub-processes and 
numerous decision nodes. Performing an analytical analysis may be extremely time 
consuming, challenging, and even impossible in some occasions. At this point, computer 
based simulation tools provide great benefits to the modelers. 
Arena® simulation software is used in this research to model the F-35’ sortie 
generation process under a simplified AL system that approximates current ALIS 
capabilities. It is a flexible and powerful tool that allows analysts to create animated 
simulation models that accurately represent virtually any system (Takus & Profozich, 
1997). A detailed description of the modeling process is presented in the following 
sections.  
Assumptions 
For convenience, some assumptions have been made during the model building 
stage. Due to the difficulty of demonstrating every activity within the F-35’s sortie 
generation process, it is assumed that a sortie generation process consists only of the sub-
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processes represented in Figure 1 and that excluded activities do not make a significant 
difference. 
The F-35 aircraft is a complex weapon system including a large number of Line 
Replaceable Components (LRC). Its mission capability depends on the full functionality 
of all LRCs. However, from a modelling view, it is not feasible to model every LRC and 
failure type. For simplicity, each F-35 is assumed as a one-LRC system which encounters 
only mission critical failures depending on the accumulated flight hours. Also, scheduled 
maintenance and depot level maintenance are assumed to be conducted at predetermined 
intervals based on accumulated flight hours.  
 As stated in Chapter 2, ALIS’s diagnostic capability is functional now, but the 
prognostic capability is not yet functional. Therefore, the prognostic capability is not 
included in the model. Also, analyzing the impact of resource levels on sortie generation 
is beyond the scope of this research. Therefore, resource capacity is assumed to be 
infinite for all processes. Process modules are used to delay the aircraft for predetermined 
time durations. Meanwhile, no resource is seized nor released by the aircraft. Thus, 
queuing problems do not occur. 
DOD reports emphasize that there will be a learning curve and reliability growth 
effect on F-35’s maintenance processes. However, learning rates or reliability growth 
rates and the processes that will be influenced by them are not explicitly known. It is 
assumed that while LCs have impacts on the process times of the Action Request (AR) 
system and maintenance activities, reliability growth influences the Mean Flight Hours 
Between Critical Failures (MFHBCF). 
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Additional assumptions include: a) The input data obtained from literature 
reviews and field experts adequately reflect real operations; b) A typical flight day is 24 
hours and flight year is 365 days; c) Flight missions are planned at a constant rate during 
an assumed five-year period; d) There is no aircraft loss or accident in flight due to a 
failure; e) Mission critical failure is the only failure type encountered by the F-35; f) 
Probability of a mission critical failure during preflight inspection and final check is 0.05 
and 0.01 respectively; g) Probability for running out of LRC supply is 0.50; h) For 85% 
of the mission critical failures, a known fix is available in the Joint Technical Documents; 
i) For 50% of the time, maintainers are able to detect PHM-related false alarms during the 
troubleshooting process; j) The aircraft in the model is the F-35’s conventional variant. 
Data Collection 
Data collection is an important simulation step and directly affects model validity. 
Since the F-35 is a relatively new system, it was difficult to obtain actual data for all 
processes within the model. Therefore, when actual data were not available, data sets 
belonging to other fighter aircraft were collected and used to model the associated 
processes. 
The majority of process delay times were taken from the “US Air Force 
Maintenance Capability and Capacity Modeling and Simulation Summary Technical 
Report” (Spencer, Hall, & Ostrander, 2010). Other process times were obtained from 
previous studies visited during the literature reviews (Faas, 2003; Rossetti & McGee, 
2006; Sheppard, 2014). Delay times for the activities in the sortie generation process and 
their related statistical distributions are presented in Table 8.  
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Table 8. Process Times and Related Distributions 
Process Time and Distribution Reference 
Refuel  *Normal (0.5, 0.145) hours (Spencer, Hall, & Ostrander, 2010b) 
Other Servicing (Oil, Liquid 
oxygen, Hydraulics, or Tires) Normal (0.3, 0.087) hours (Spencer et al., 2010b) 
Configuration (Weapon 
Loading or Pod Installation) Uniform (28, 249) minutes 
Adjusted from (Spencer et 
al., 2010b) 
Pre-Flight Inspection Triangular (50,60,70) minutes (Faas, 2003) 
Engine Start, Final Systems 
Check, and Taxiing Normal (0.8, 0.232) hours (Spencer et al., 2010b) 
Takeoff  Triangular (2,3,4) minutes (Faas, 2003) 
Sortie Normal (2, 0.5) hours  (Faas, 2003) 
Landing  Triangular (14,15,16) minutes (Faas, 2003) 
Parking and Recovery  Triangular (5,7,9) minutes (Faas, 2003) 
Downloading PMD into 
ALIS Triangular (7,10,13) minutes 
Adjusted from (The Office 
of The Director, 2015) 
Basic Post-Flight Operations 
and Aircrew Debrief  Normal (2, 0.58) hours (Spencer et al., 2010b) 
Troubleshooting  Triangular (20, 24, 30) minutes (Faas, 2003) 
Wait for Part to issue from 
supply Triangular (0.5, 2, 2.5) hours (Rossetti & McGee, 2006) 
Unscheduled Maintenance  Triangular (9, 9.7, 10.4) hours Adjusted from (The Office of The Director, 2015) 
Scheduled Maintenance  Triangular (5,7,8) days (Rossetti & McGee, 2006) 
Depot Level Maintenance  Triangular (110, 131, 144) days (Sheppard, 2014) 
*Normal (Mean, Standard Deviation) 
The F-35A’s maintenance data and PHM statistics were obtained from the 2015 
DOT&E report and are presented in Table 9. According to this data, the F-35 PHM 
system has the capability of detecting 84% of the mission critical failures with 85% of 
those detections being correct. Furthermore, in the instance of the failure being a non-
electronic fault, 79% of the correct detections are isolated successfully to a single LRC. 
Therefore, the PHM system can accurately detect only 71.4% of the mission critical non-
electrical failures and successfully isolate only 57.1% of them to a LRC. 
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Table 9. Actual MFHBCF, MCMTCF, MFHBFA and PHM Data for F-35A (The Office of The 
Director, 2015) 
Mean Flight Hours Between Critical Failures  (MFHBCF) 10.2 hours 
Mean Corrective Maintenance Time for Critical Failure (MCMTCF) 9.7 hours 
Mean Flight Hours Between Flight Safety Critical False Alarm 170 hours 
Fault Detection Coverage (percent mission critical failures detectable by 
PHM)  84% 
Fault Detection Rate (percent correct detections for detectable failures)  85% 
Fault Isolation Rate (percent isolation of Non-Electronic Fault to One LRC  79% 
 
The AR system within the ALIS is used to provide resolutions to the problems of 
which known fixes are not available in the technical documents or PHM system. A 2016 
study conducted by Colbacchini et al. (2016) provided some valuable data about the 
resolution process of Category 1 (critical) problems through the AR. Our research 
translates their dataset into triangular distributions used to model the AR system as 
presented in Table 10. 
Table 10. Process Times within the AR System 
Initiation Process Triangular (12, 24, 30) hours 
Optional Screening Point (OSP) Triangular (12, 24, 30) hours 
Required Screening Point (RSP) Triangular (1, 2, 2.5) days 
Resolution Triangular (9, 11, 13) days 
 
Model Development 
Our simulation model represents the sortie generation process of a 16-aircraft F-
35 fleet in a notional base in Turkey over a five-year period. There are 24 hours in a 
flight day and 365 days in a flight year. Flight missions are planned at a constant rate. If 
there is an available aircraft in the aircraft pool, the mission is initiated immediately. 
Otherwise, the mission is cancelled. 
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The global input variables used in the model are presented in Table 11. 
MFHBFA, fault coverage rate, correct fault detection rate, fault isolation rate, reliability 
growth rate, and learning curve rate are determined as the critical factors which are used 
during the design of experiment (DOE) stage. Their impacts on the sortie generation 
process are examined by setting them to different levels under different scenarios. 
Table 11. Global Variables 
Variable Initial value Unit 
*MFHBFA 170 HOUR 
MFHBCF 10.2 HOUR 
MFHBDLME 2,000 HOUR 
MFHBSME 400 HOUR 
FLIGHT TIME 0 HOUR 
*FAULT COVERAGE RATE 84 PERCENT 
*CORRECT FAULT DETECTION RATE 85 PERCENT 
*FAULT ISOLATION RATE 79 PERCENT 
HEALTHY1 95 PERCENT 
HEALTHY2 99 PERCENT 
AR CORRECT 95 PERCENT 
*RELIABILTY GROWTH RATE 0 PERCENT 
*LEARNING CURVE RATE 100 PERCENT 
PLANNED FLIGHT HOURS 0 HOUR 
FLYING SCHEDULING EFFECTIVENESS RATE 0 PERCENT 
AIRCRAFT AVAILABILITY RATE 0 PERCENT 
SUPPLY AVAILABILITY 50 PERCENT 
*KNOWN FIX AVAILABILITY 85 PERCENT 
*Critical factors used in the DOE 
An overall view of the simulation model is presented in Figure 6. It was built 
based on the sortie generation activities defined in Figure 1.  The model building process 
is explained thoroughly in the following sections. 
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Figure 6. Sortie Generation Model 
 
Model Initialization 
The simulation model is started with the creation of 16 aircraft entities which are 
then routed to the aircraft pool to wait for a flight mission signal from the mission 
planning area. The Aircraft pool is a hold module which releases one aircraft after a 
mission signal is received from the flight planning area. After release, the flight duration 
determined in the flight planning area is assigned to the aircraft, and the aircraft goes to 
the preflight operations area.  On completion of the sortie generation cycle, the aircraft 
does not leave the model; it returns to the aircraft pool and waits for the next mission. 
The flight scheduling area is a combination of create, assign, signal, record, and 
disposal modules. A flight mission is created every hour at a constant rate. Once a flight 
mission is created, an assign module determines the flight duration according to a normal 
distribution with a mean of 2 hours and standard deviation of 0. 5 hours. Then, a mission 
signal is sent to the hold module to release an aircraft from the aircraft pool. If any 
aircraft is available, the flight mission starts. Otherwise, the flight is cancelled. After the 
mission is signaled, an assign module accumulates the planned flight hours and assigns it 
to PLANNED FLIGHT HOURS global variable. An overall view of the model 
initialization is presented in Figure 7. 
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Figure 7. Model Initialization Process 
 
Preflight Operations 
After an aircraft is released from the aircraft pool, it is routed to the refueling 
area. Then, a decide module checks the need for additional servicing. Fifty percent of the 
time, the aircraft requires servicing for oil, liquid oxygen, hydraulics, or tire check. 
Following the servicing, a transition from one configuration to another starts. It involves 
alternate mission equipment download and upload and munitions upload. After the 
aircraft is configured, a pre-flight inspection is conducted to check if any mission critical 
failure is present or not.  During the inspection, there is a 0.05 probability that a mission 
critical failure is detected. If there is a failure, the aircraft is routed to the PHM area; 
otherwise it is transferred to the sortie area. The overall view of the pre-flight operations 
is presented in Figure 8. 
 
Figure 8. Pre-flight Operations 
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Sortie 
Completing the pre-flight operations, the engine is started and final checks are 
conducted to detect possible mission critical failures. At this point, the probability of a 
mission critical failure’s occurrence is 0.01. If there is a failure, the aircraft is routed to 
the PHM area; otherwise it releases the parking area and begins taxiing onto the runway 
for take-off. The aircraft takes off and the sortie is executed based on a flight duration 
predetermined in the mission planning area. Then the aircraft comes to the landing 
module and is delayed there. The overall view of the sortie is presented in Figure 9. 
 
Figure 9. Sortie Process 
 
Following the landing, an assign module calculates the flying scheduling 
effectiveness (FSE) rate of the fleet and assigns it to the FLYING SCHEDULING 
EFFECTIVENESS RATE global variable. Additionally, the attributes presented below 
are assigned to the aircraft. These attributes are flight hours accumulated by each aircraft. 
Their usages are explained in the following sections. 
• AIRCRAFT MFHBCF: Flight Hours Between Critical Failures  
• AIRCRAFT MFHBSME: Flight Hours Between Scheduled Maintenance 
• AIRCRAFT MFHBFA: Flight Hours Between False Alarms  
• AIRCRAFT MFHBDLME: Flight Hours Between Depot Level 
Maintenance  
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Post-Flight Operations 
After landing, the aircraft is routed to the parking area. Then, aircrew debriefing 
and basic post-flight operations (BPO) are conducted concurrently. During BPO, 
maintainers download post flight Health Reporting Codes (HRC) from the aircraft to 
ALIS through a Ground Data Security Assembly Receptacle (GDR). The HRCs are used 
by ALIS’s PHM system to check the aircraft health status.  
PHM Area 
Holding the fault coverage, fault detection, fault isolation and false alarm logic, 
the PHM area is the most crucial part of the model. It consists of a combination of assign 
and decision modules. The overall view of the area is represented in Figure 10. 
 
Figure 10. PHM Area 
 
At the beginning of the PHM process, a decide module checks for false alarms. A 
false alarm (false positive) indicates that there is a failure given that none exists. The 
decide module compares the AIRCRAFT MFHBFA attribute value to a predetermined 
MFHBFA (170 hours) to decide whether there is a false alarm or not. If the related 
aircraft’s AIRCRAFT MFHBFA attribute value exceeds the MFHBFA value, then a false 
alarm occurs. If there is a false alarm, then the value one is assigned to the AIRCRAFT 
FALSE ALARM attribute value; the AIRCRAFT MFHBFA attribute value is reset to 
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zero and the aircraft is sent to a decide module checking the fleet cumulative flight hours. 
Otherwise, the aircraft is directly sent to the decide module checking the fleet cumulative 
flight hour.  
Next, a decide module checks whether the fleet cumulative flight hours are above 
or below the 2100-hour level, which is the starting point of reliability growth for Mean 
Flight Hours Between Critical Failures (MFHBCF). As presented in Table 8, currently 
the MFHBCF is 10.2 hours. However, after the fleet exceeds 2100 flight hours, it begins 
to improve. A detailed explanation for the implementation of the reliability growth is 
presented in the following sections.  
After the reliability growth check, an unscheduled-maintenance check module 
compares MFHBCF to the AIRCRAFT MFHBCF attribute value and determines the 
current condition of the aircraft. At this point, an aircraft may be in one of the following 
categories: A) Critical failure, B) Critical failure and false alarm (treated as critical 
failure), C) False alarm, D) Healthy. Category A means that the AIRCRAFT MFHBCF 
attribute value exceeded the MFHBCF and a mission critical failure occurred. Category B 
means that both a critical failure occurred and a false alarm was assigned to the aircraft 
previously in the false alarm check area. Category C means that no critical failure 
occurred but a false alarm was assigned to the aircraft in the previous module. Category 
D means that the aircraft has neither a critical failure nor a false alarm. 
 If the aircraft is in category A or B, it is sent to an assign module and value of 
one is assigned to the AIRCRAFT REAL ALARM attribute value, and then the aircraft is 
transferred to the failure coverage check.  If the aircraft is in category C, it is directly sent 
to the failure coverage check without being assigned a real alarm. Finally, if the aircraft is 
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in category D, it skips the unscheduled maintenance and directly goes to the scheduled 
maintenance check. 
If there is a false alarm or real failure, a fault coverage check is applied to see 
whether the fault is covered by the PHM or not. The current PHM fault coverage rate is 
0.84. If the failure is not within the PHM coverage, the aircraft is routed to the 
troubleshooting area for further inspections; otherwise it is transferred to another deicide 
module to see whether the fault detection is correct or not. The current correct detection 
rate of the PHM system is 0.85. If the detection is not correct, an assign module assigns 
value of one to attribute MISDETECTION, and then the aircraft is routed to the fault 
isolation check. Otherwise, the aircraft is directly sent to the fault isolation check module. 
Misdetection means that the aircraft has a problem, but it is defined inaccurately; 
therefore, an incorrect maintenance action would be applied to attempt to fix it.  
After fault detection, the fault isolation module checks whether the fault can be 
isolated to one specific LRC or not. The current fault isolation rate of the PHM system is 
0.79. If the fault can be isolated to one specific LRC, then the AIRCRAFT REAL 
ALARM and the AIRCRAFT FALSE ALARM attribute values are reset to zero and the 
aircraft is routed to the unscheduled maintenance module; otherwise the aircraft is sent to 
the troubleshooting area for further inspection.  
Troubleshooting and Action Request 
If a mission critical failure is not covered or isolated by the PHM system, then the 
aircraft is routed to a troubleshooting process for further inspection. After the 
troubleshooting, a decide module checks whether the failure is a real alarm or not. If it is 
a real alarm, then the AIRCRAFT REAL ALARM attribute value is reset to zero and the 
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aircraft is transferred to the known fix availability check. If it is a false alarm, the 
AIRCRAFT FALSE ALARM attribute value is reset to zero and a decide module checks 
whether maintainers can detect the false alarm or not. It is assumed that maintainers catch 
a false alarm 50 percent of the time. If the maintainers catch the false alarm, the aircraft 
skips the unnecessary unscheduled maintenance and directly goes to a scheduled 
maintenance check. Otherwise, the aircraft is routed to the known fix availability check 
and ends with an unnecessary unscheduled maintenance action. 
After the real and false alarm checks, a decide module checks whether a known 
fix is available in the technical documents or not. The probability of a known fix is 0.85. 
If the known fix is available, the aircraft is directly sent to the unscheduled maintenance 
area; otherwise an action request (AR) is initiated to find a solution to the fault by the 
assistance of Lockheed Martin engineers. Overall views of the troubleshooting process 
and the AR system are represented in Figure 11 and Figure 12.  
 
Figure 11. Troubleshooting Process 
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Figure 12. Action Request Process 
 
An AR is delayed within the AR system according to the times and distributions 
presented in Table 10. OPS and RSP checkpoints ensure that the AR is detailed and 
complete before sending the AR to the Lockheed Martin engineers. There is a 0.95 
probability that AR passes through these checkpoints without any problem. If there is a 
problem, the AR is sent back to the initiation step (Colbacchini et al., 2016).  After a 
resolution is found, the aircraft is routed to the unscheduled area. 
Colbacchini et al. (2016) indicated that current AR process times are longer than 
the desired values. Our research assumes that a learning curve effect takes place within 
the AR process. A detailed explanation is presented in the Implementation of the 
Learning Curves section. 
Maintenance Operations 
Maintenance processes consist of unscheduled maintenance, scheduled 
maintenance, and depot level maintenance. Figure 13 represents the overall maintenance 
area. 
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Figure 13. Maintenance Processes 
 
Once the aircraft is routed to the unscheduled maintenance area, a record module 
counts the number of unscheduled maintenance. Before the maintenance, a decide 
module checks if there are an adequate number of LRCs or not. Fifty percent of the time, 
the LRC quantity is insufficient and the aircraft is delayed until replenishment arrives. If 
there is enough supply, the unscheduled maintenance is initiated immediately. After the 
maintenance is conducted, the AIRCRAFT MFHBCF attribute value is reset to zero and 
the aircraft is sent to a decide module for functionality check. If the MISDETECTION 
attribute value is one, then previous fault detection and fault isolation actions were done 
inaccurately by the PHM system and the wrong maintenance activity was conducted to 
the aircraft. Therefore, the MISDETECTION attribute value is reset to zero and the 
aircraft is routed to the troubleshooting module for further inspection. 
If the MISDETECTION attribute value is zero, the aircraft is routed to another 
decide module for a scheduled maintenance check. Scheduled maintenance is conducted 
based on the accumulated flight hours. The default value for mean flight hours between 
scheduled maintenance is 400 hours and is recorded in the MFHBSME global variable. If 
the AIRCRAFT MFHBSME attribute value does not exceed the MFHBSME variable 
value, the aircraft is directly sent to depot level maintenance; otherwise scheduled 
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maintenance is conducted. After the scheduled maintenance, the AIRCRAFT 
MFHBSME is reset to zero and the aircraft is routed to depot level maintenance.  
When the aircraft needs any modification or upgrade, it is sent to the depot level 
maintenance area. Like scheduled maintenance, depot level maintenance is also 
determined according to the accumulated flight hours. The default value of mean flight 
hours between depot level maintenance is 2000 hours and recorded in the MFHBDLME 
global variable. If the AIRCRAFT MFHBDLME attribute value does not exceed the 
MFHBDLME variable value, then the aircraft is routed directly to the aircraft pool; 
otherwise the aircraft undergoes depot level maintenance. After the depot level 
maintenance, the AIRCRAFT MFHBD is reset to zero and the aircraft is transferred to 
the aircraft pool.  
Implementation of the Reliability Growth for the MFHBCF 
The 2015 DOT&E report indicates that reliability growth takes place within the F-
35 system.  As shown in Table 12, while MFHBCF value for F-35A was 8.2 hours at 
8,834 cumulative flight hours, it improved to 10.2 hours at 15,845 cumulative flight 
hours. The target value for MFHBCF at 75,000 cumulative flight hours was defined as 20 
hours.  
Table 12. Cumulative Flight Hours versus MFHBCF 
Cumulative Flight Hours MFHBCF 
8,834 (August 2014) 8.2 
15,845 (May 31 2015) 10.2 
75,000 (Maturity level) 20 
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According to Table 12, in a 10-month period between August 2014 and May 31 
2015, nearly 7,000 flight hours were accumulated by the F-35A, which equates to 700 
flight hours per month.  The most recent MFHBCF, 10.2 hours, was calculated based on 
the flight hours accumulated within a three-month rolling window starting in March 1 
2015 and ending in May 31 2015. Therefore, it can be derived that, by March 1 2015, 
accumulated flight hours were approximately 13,745 and the remaining flight hours to 
maturity (75,000 flight hours) were about 61,000 hours. 
If the March 1 2015 is assumed as the initial point for a reliability test, we obtain 
the parameter values:  
Cumulative test time at the end of the test (T) = 6,100 flight hours 
Length of initial test cycle in cumulative test time (t1) = 2,100 flight hours 
Final Mean Time To Failure (MTTF) (MF) = 20 flight hours 
Initial MTTF (Mi) = 10.2 flight hours 
Using the data above, a reliability growth rate can be calculated using Equation 2.  
α = ln �610002100 � − 1 + ��1 + ln �61002100��2 + 2 ln � 2010.2��0.5 = 0.15 
 
Based on this growth rate, instantaneous MFHBCF can be calculated using 
Equation 3. 
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀(𝑡𝑡) = � 10.2, 0 < 𝑡𝑡 < 210010.2(1 − 0.15) ( 𝑡𝑡2100)0.15, 𝑡𝑡 ≥  2100  
This result indicates that until 2,100 flight hours, the MFHBCF is 10.2 hours; 
after 2,100 flight hours, reliability growth takes place and MFHBCF begins to improve. 
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Anticipated MFHBCF values are presented in Table 13 for some cumulative flight hour 
levels when the growth rate is assumed to be 0.15. 
Table 13. Reliability Growth for MFHBCF 
MFHBCF Cumulative Flight Hours 
12.7 3,000 
13.8 5,000 
15.2 10,000 
16.2 15,000 
16.9 20,000 
18.8 40,000 
19.9 60,000 
 
In the simulation model, reliability growth rate was defined as a global variable 
with a default value of zero.  Equation 3 was embedded into the decide module that 
checks the unscheduled maintenance need caused by the mission critical failures.  During 
the design of experiment stage, reliability growth’s impact on the sortie generation 
performance measures is investigated by changing the growth rate under different 
scenarios. 
Implementation of the Learning Curves 
Colbacchini et al. (2016) indicated that current AR process times are longer than 
the desired values. These delay times considerably increase the aircraft downtime, since 
the aircraft is in a non-mission capable state until a resolution is found for the AR. 
However, Chapter 2 notes that it is possible that the time required to perform AR tasks 
may decrease as maintenance personnel gain more experience after each AR initiation.  
Therefore, Equation 1 is embedded into the related AR process modules to 
implement a learning curve (LCs) effect on the AR activities. Learning rate is defined as 
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a global variable with a default value of one which means there is no learning from 
experience. During the design of experiment stage, LCs’ impact on the sortie generation 
performance measures is investigated by changing the learning rate under different 
scenarios. Assuming a 95% learning rate, possible change in the average time of the 
resolution process is presented in Table 14. 
Table 14. Impact of a 95% Learning Rate on the Resolution Time 
Time (days) Number of Repetitions 
13.00 1 
12.35 2 
11.98 3 
11.15 8 
10.64 15 
10.11 30 
9.25 100 
8.21 500 
 
The second place for a potential LC effect is within unscheduled maintenance. 
Presently, the Mean Corrective Maintenance Time for Critical Failure (MCMTCF) is 9.7 
hours, while the desired value is 4 hours. The 2015 DOT&E report highlights that 
learning curve effect is likely to improve the F-35’s repair times. As maintainers become 
more familiar with common failure modes, their ability to repair them more quickly 
improves over time (The Office of The Director, 2015). Therefore, a second LC function 
is embedded into the unscheduled maintenance module. Assuming a 95% learning rate, 
possible change in the average unscheduled maintenance process time is presented in 
Table 15. 
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Table 15. Impact of the 95% Learning Rate on the MCMTCF 
Time (hours) Number of Repetitions 
9.70 1 
9.22 2 
8.18 10 
7.26 50 
6.12 500 
5.82 1,000 
5.53 2,000 
5.25 4,000 
4.99 8,000 
Model Verification and Validation 
Model verification and validation are vital steps for a simulation study to provide 
realistic outputs. Even a simple structural mistake or logic error may cause the results to 
dramatically deviate from their true values. To build the model correctly, the entire sortie 
generation process was divided into relatively simpler sub processes and each sub process 
was developed individually. Complexity was added to the model gradually and each 
major addition was saved as a different version to avoid potential data loss. The model 
was animated frequently to check whether the aircraft flowed through the modules 
reasonably or not. That was very helpful to detect the errors in the model logic. After the 
model was complete, it was run for 30 replications to check if it produced a flying 
scheduling effectiveness (FSE) rate similar to the real world data obtained from the 2015 
DOT&E report, when the aircraft availability (AA) rate was close to the real-world data. 
Logically, when the model produced AA rates close to real world data (51%), we 
expected the FSE rate also to be close to the real world data. The comparisons in the 
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Table 16 show that at an AA rate close to the real world data, our model produces a FSE 
rate reasonably close to the real-world data.   
Table 16. Real World FSE Rate versus Simulation FSE Rate 
Real World Data Simulation Result 
AA Rate (%) FSE Rate (%) AA Rate (%) FSE Rate (%) 
51 65 49.47 69.28 
 
For the model validation, three subject matter experts (SME) were consulted. 
Based on their evaluations and suggestions, some important changes in the process flows 
and input data were made to meet the operational needs of the air force.  Moreover, 
official ALS reports and Air Force documents were used to ensure an acceptable level of 
model validity. Therefore, it was decided that the model was appropriate for the needs of 
the Air Force. 
Conclusion 
The simulation model in this study was built to represent the sortie generation 
process of an F-35A fleet under ALS. Actual condition of the ALS was taken into 
consideration rather than the theoretical expectations, since ALIS does not yet meet the 
desired level of functionality. During the model building stage, the main attention was 
given to the PHM system and the AR system due to their uniqueness to the F-35. Only 
mission critical failures were considered, since most of the available F-35 data was 
related to them. 
Literature reviews indicated that little prior research was conducted examining the 
impact of the learning curves and reliability growth on the sortie generation process. 
However, as the 2015 DOT&E report indicated, it is very likely that the F-35 will be 
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influenced by these concepts. Therefore, appropriate LCs and reliability growth equations 
were embedded into the model. 
This chapter thoroughly explained the data collection, model building, and 
implementation of the LCs and reliability growth.  Results obtained from the simulation 
model and their related analyses are presented in the following chapter. 
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IV. Analysis and Results 
The previous chapter explained the simulation modeling of the F-35’s sortie 
generation process.  This chapter covers the steps which are followed to obtain and 
analyze the simulation results. These steps include defining the key performance 
measures of the sortie generation process, building a designed experiment, and 
statistically analyzing the experimental outputs. 
Measures of Performance (MOP) for the Sortie Generation Process 
Literature reviews showed that aircraft reliability, aircraft maintainability, and 
aircraft availability are some critical MOPs used to evaluate the performance of an air 
force logistics system.   
Aircraft reliability is related to failure frequency encountered by the aircraft. Its 
assessment includes a variety of metrics like Mean Flight Hours Between Critical Failure, 
Mean Flight Hours Between Removal, and Mean Flight Hours Between Maintenance 
Events. Each metric characterizes a unique aspect of overall weapon system reliability.  
Aircraft maintainability is a measure to assess the amount of the time needed to 
repair an aircraft to return it to flying status again. Its main metric is the Mean Time To 
Repair. 
Aircraft availability (AA)  rate is determined by measuring the percent of time 
that an individual aircraft is in the “available” status, aggregated over a reporting period 
(The Office of The Director, 2015).  The aircraft which are not available are assigned to 
one of three categories: Not Mission Capable for Maintenance, Not Mission Capable for 
Supply, or Depot status.   
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For this research, AA rate and flying scheduling effectiveness (FSE) rate were 
chosen as the key MOPs of the F-35’s sortie generation process. FSE rate is calculated by 
dividing the total flight hours to the total planned flight hours and it is directly related to 
the AA rate. While high availability rates ensure more flight hours achievement, low 
availability rates prevent the fleet from achieving the planned flight hour goals.  
Run Length and Replication 
The simulation run length was determined as 5 years and 24 hours a day to allow 
each aircraft to go through depot level maintenance at least once. Moreover, this run 
length was useful to see the impacts of the learning curves and reliability growth in the 
long term.  
After deciding the simulation run length, the second step was to determine the 
number of replications adequate to obtain accurate results from the simulation 
experiment. Literature reviews showed that there is no simple guidance on the number of 
replicates needed. Although more replication leads to more successful analysis, cost or 
time considerations often dictate the number of replicates that can be achieved. Previous 
simulation studies generally used 20 to 30 replications. For this research, an initial 
replication number was selected as 30 rather than 20 since the additional computation 
time between 20 replications and 30 replications was minimal.  
Next, a pilot experiment was conducted to check whether 30 replications were 
enough to obtain normally distributed output data or not. Then, output data were 
imported into the JMP® Software, and Shapiro-Wilk goodness of fit (GOF) test was 
applied to their residuals. As presented in Appendix A, both FSE rate and AA rate passed 
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the GOF test at the alpha level of 0.05. Moreover, distribution graphs of the residuals 
appeared to have an acceptably normal bell shaped curve. Therefore, it was decided that 
30 replications were adequate to carry out a successful experiment.  
Design of Experiment 
The literature review identified that learning curves, reliability growth, and PHM 
related factors had the potential of influencing the MOPs. Therefore, after randomly 
changing these candidate variables, several pilot simulation runs were executed to gain a 
better insight into their behaviors. Based on the initial findings, the following seven 
factors were determined as critical:  Learning curve rate (LCR), reliability growth rate 
(RGR), Mean Flight Hours Between False Alarms (MFHBFA), Fault Coverage Rate 
(FCR), Correct Fault Detection Rate (CFDR), Fault Isolation Rate (FIR), and Known Fix 
Availability Rate (KFAR). Next, the factor count was decreased to three by combining 
MFHBFA, FCR, CFDR, FIR, and KFAR into a single PHM composite factor to reduce 
the combinatorial growth of possible experiment treatments. After determining the most 
important factors, their associated levels were set based on the literature reviews, official 
reports, and expert views (see Table 17). 
Table 17. Critical Factors and Their Associated Levels 
Factor / Level Low Medium High 
PHM 
PHM1 PHM2 PHM3 
MFHBFA 170 MFHBFA 270 MFHBFA 370 
FCR 84% FCR 90% FCR 95% 
CFDR 85% FCDR 90% FCDR 95% 
FIR 79% FIR 85% FIR 90% 
KFAR 85% KFAR 90% KFAR 95% 
Reliability Growth Rate (RGR) RGR1 0.00 RGR2 0.10 RGR3 0.20 
Learning Curve Rate (LCR) LCR1 1.00 LCR2 0.95 LCR3 0.90 
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Note that when the RGR and LCR factors are both set at their low levels, a system 
is represented with no reliability growth and no task learning curve time reductions. 
Since there were three factors with three levels, a full factorial design was 
selected to examine all possible combinations of the factors and find out the cause and 
effect relationships between them and MOPs. As presented in Table 18, 27 experiment 
runs or simulation scenarios were obtained as a result of the 3x3x3 full factorial design. 
Table 18. Design of Experiment 
Run / Factor PHM level 
Reliability Growth 
Rate (RGR) 
Learning Curve 
Rate (LCR) 
111 PHM1 RGR1 LCR1 
112 PHM1 RGR1 LCR2 
113 PHM1 RGR1 LCR3 
121 PHM1 RGR2 LCR1 
122 PHM1 RGR2 LCR2 
123 PHM1 RGR2 LCR3 
131 PHM1 RGR3 LCR1 
132 PHM1 RGR3 LCR2 
133 PHM1 RGR3 LCR3 
211 PHM2 RGR1 LCR1 
212 PHM2 RGR1 LCR2 
213 PHM2 RGR1 LCR3 
221 PHM2 RGR2 LCR1 
222 PHM2 RGR2 LCR2 
223 PHM2 RGR2 LCR3 
231 PHM2 RGR3 LCR1 
232 PHM2 RGR3 LCR2 
233 PHM2 RGR3 LCR3 
311 PHM3 RGR1 LCR1 
312 PHM3 RGR1 LCR2 
313 PHM3 RGR1 LCR3 
321 PHM3 RGR2 LCR1 
322 PHM3 RGR2 LCR2 
323 PHM3 RGR2 LCR3 
331 PHM3 RGR3 LCR1 
332 PHM3 RGR3 LCR2 
333 PHM3 RGR3 LCR3 
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Output Analysis 
Tests of the ANOVA Assumptions 
Designing a 3x3x3 full factorial DOE, each scenario was replicated for 30 times 
and output data were transferred into the JMP for further statistical analyses. ANOVA 
was the main analysis applied to the data.   At the beginning of the ANOVA, following 
assumptions were checked to see whether it was appropriate to use ANOVA or not: 1) 
Normality, 2) Constant variance, 3) Independence. 
The first assumption check was the normality of residuals. After all experiments 
were completed, Shapiro-Wilk Goodness of Fit test was applied to the residuals of FSE 
rate and AA rate. As presented in Figure 32 and Figure 33 in Appendix B, at the alpha 
level of 0.05, neither of them passed the test. However, their distribution histograms 
visually appeared normal. Therefore, it was assumed that residuals of the MOPs were 
approximately normally distributed.  
Secondly, the assumption of constant variance was checked. Scatter plots of the 
FSE rate and AA rate in Figure 34 and Figure 35 in Appendix B demonstrated that 
residuals were homogenous throughout the sample and variability in the measurement 
error was constant.  
Lastly, independence was checked. Residuals’ overlay plots in Figure 36 and 
Figure 37 in Appendix B illustrated that residuals were not following a trend. Therefore, 
it was decided that the assumption of independence was satisfied. 
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ANOVA Analysis for AA Rate 
After assumptions were tested, ANOVA analysis was conducted to examine the 
effects of the factors on the MOPs. Then, the research questions determined in Chapter 1 
were answered. 
First, the AA rate was analyzed. The ANOVA analysis of the AA rate in Table 19 
shows that the model explains nearly 99.2 percent of the total variability.  Overall F-
Test’s p-value is smaller than 0.05, which means that the model is statistically significant 
at the 95% level in explaining the variability in the AA rate.  
Table 19. ANOVA Results for the AA Rate 
 
 
The effect tests in Table 20 show that all factors and their associated two-way 
interactions have statistically significant impacts on the AA rate at the 95% level. Having 
the highest F Ratio, PHM is the most influential factor on the AA rate.  
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Table 20. Effect Tests for AA Rate 
 
 
Following the effect tests, plots of the Least Squares (LS) Means were produced 
and a Tukey test was conducted. While the LS Means plot is a visual test to see the 
relative differences in the response, a Tukey test provides a quantitative test serving the 
same purpose. 
LS Means plots in Figure 14 visually show each factor’s individual impact on the 
AA rate.  According to these plots and Tukey tests in Appendix C, all factors have 
statistically significant impact on the AA rate. Moreover, the PHM level and LC rate 
have greater influence on the AA rate than does RG rate.  
 
Figure 14. LS Means Plots of the Factors 
 
Figure 15, Figure 16, and Figure 17 depict two-way interactions of the factors and 
their associated impacts on the AA rate.  Both these plots and Tukey tests presented in 
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the Appendix C indicate that two-way interactions have statistically significant 
differences at all levels. 
 
Figure 15. LS Means Plot of the PHM -RG Rate Interaction 
 
 
Figure 16. LS Means Plot of the PHM -LC Rate Interaction 
 
 
Figure 17. LS Means Plot of the RG Rate-LC Rate Interaction 
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AA rates which were achieved under 27 different scenarios are charted in 
Figure 18 labeled with levels for PHM, RG rate, and LCR rate. Supporting the ANOVA 
analysis and effect tests, Figure 18 also demonstrates that all factors and their associated 
levels significantly affect the AA rate.  When each factor’s individual impact is examined 
in Figure 18, the PHM and LC rate seem more significant than the RG rate. Additionally, 
the lowest AA rate is realized as 49.47%, when all factors are at low values (111 run) and 
the highest AA rate is realized as 76.36%, when all factors are at high levels (333 run).  
 
Figure 18. AA Rates under Different Factor Combinations 
 
ANOVA Analysis for FSE Rate 
As presented in Table 21, the adjusted R Square value of the model is almost 97.9 
percent, which means that the model explains 97.9 percent of the total variability.  The 
overall F-Test’s p-value is smaller than 0.05, which indicates that the model is 
statistically significant at the 95% level in explaining the variability.  
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Table 21. ANOVA Results for the FSE Rate 
 
The effect tests in Table 22 show that all factors and their associated two-way 
interactions are statistically significant on the FSE rate. Having the highest F Ratio, the 
PHM is the statistically most significant factor.  
Table 22. Effect Tests for FSE Rate 
 
The LS Means plots in Figure 19 show each factor’s individual impact on the FSE 
rate.  As the plots depict, PHM and LC rate have greater influence on the FSE rate than 
does RG rate. However, their impacts diminish as their levels are increased.  Tukey tests 
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presented in Appendix D also indicate that all levels of every factor significantly affect 
the FSE rate.  
 
Figure 19. LS Means Plots of the Factors 
 
Figure 20 represents the LS Means plot of PHM-RG rate interactions. According 
to the plot, when the PHM level is PHM3, the impact of RG rate on the FSE rate is 
minimal. Furthermore, Tukey tests in the Appendix D indicate that there is no statistically 
significant difference between (PHM2-RG3) and (PHM3-RGR1).  
 
Figure 20. LS Means Plot of the PHM Level-RG Rate Interaction 
 
The LS Means plot of the PHM level-LC rate interactions in Figure 21 shows that 
when the PHM level is increased, the LC rate affects the FSE rate at a diminishing rate. 
Moreover, at the PHM3 level, increasing the LC rate from LCR2 to LCR3 does not 
change the FSE rate significantly. Supporting this, a Tukey test in Appendix D shows that 
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there is no statistically significant difference between the following factor interactions: 
(PHM2-LCR3), (PHM3-LCR3), (PHM3-LCR2), (PHM3-LCR1) and (PHM1-LCR3). 
 
Figure 21. LS Means Plot of the PHM Level-LC Rate Interaction 
 
The LS Means plot of the LC rate-RG rate interactions in Figure 22 demonstrates 
that when the RG rate is increased, the LC rate effect on the FSE rate diminishes slightly. 
Similarly, when the LC rate is increased, the effect of the RG rate on the FSE diminishes 
slightly. According to the Tukey test in Appendix D, there is no statistically significant 
difference between the (RGR1-LCR3) and (RGR3-LCR2) interactions.  
 
Figure 22. LS Means Plot of the RG Rate-LC Rate Interaction 
 
The FSE rates achieved under the 27 different scenarios are charted in Figure 23 
labeled with levels for PHM, RG rate, and LC rate. Parallel to the ANOVA analysis and 
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effect tests, this figure also shows that all factors and their associated levels significantly 
affect the FSE rate. The lowest FSE rate is realized as 69.28%, when all factors are at low 
levels (111 run). As for the highest FSE rate, it is realized as 81.41% in the 233 run, when 
the PHM level is medium and other factors are high. This result is not surprising, since it 
supports Figures 21 and 22 which demonstrate that at PHM3, high levels of LC rate and 
RG rate do not significantly affect the FSE rate. 
 
Figure 23. FSE Rates under Different Factor Combinations 
 
Analysis of the PHM Level 
As stated in the DOE section, the PHM composite factor is a combination of five 
sub-variables: Mean Flight Hours Between False Alarms (MFHBFA), Fault Coverage 
Rate (FCR), Correct Fault Detection Rate (CFDR), Fault Isolation Rate (FIR), and 
Known Fix Availability Rate (KFAR). The results of ANOVA analysis indicated that the 
PHM was the most significant factor on both FSE rate and AA rate. Therefore, some 
further analysis was conducted to investigate the individual impact of its sub-variables on 
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the sortie generation process. For this purpose, RG rate and LC rate were set to their 
initial values and some one-factor scenarios were examined.  
First, effects of false alarms on the total unscheduled maintenance time were 
investigated by assigning some arbitrary values to MFHBFA global variable in the 
simulation model while all other factors were kept constant. As shown in Figure 24, when 
the MFHBFA is increased, total time spent for unscheduled maintenance decreases since 
unnecessary maintenance is avoided. The decrease in the maintenance time occurs at a 
diminishing rate. After the MFHBFA reaches 70 hours, the improvement in the 
maintenance time dramatically slows down; after 370 hours, it almost stops, which means 
the false alarms number is very low and they are not significant in the model. Like total 
maintenance time, FSE rate and AA rate improve diminishingly, as MFFBFA is 
increased gradually over time (See Figure 25).  
 
Figure 24. Total Maintenance Time vs. MFHBFA 
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Figure 25. Impact of MFHBFA on the FSE Rate and AA Rate 
  
ANOVA results in Appendix E also support the findings in Figure 24 and 25.  
They show that increasing the MFHBFA from 170 hours to 370 hours provides only 
small statistically significant improvements in the maintenance time, AA rate, and FSE 
rate. 
Secondly, individual impacts of the FCR, CFDR, FIR and KFAR were examined. 
To see their impact on the MOPs, they were individually set to three different levels and 
the simulation model was replicated 30 times. Figures 26, 27, 28, and 29 illustrate their 
impacts on the FSE rate and AA rate, and Appendices F to I include their associated 
ANOVA analyses.  Both the figures and ANOVA results indicate that all sub-variables 
have statistically significant impacts on the MOPs. Furthermore, the KFAR is the most 
significant one among them. When the KFAR is increased from 85% to 95%, AA rate 
improves from 49.47% to 58.7% and FSE rate improves from 69.28% to 76.19%. This 
finding supports the importance of the completeness of the F-35’s technical documents. 
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Figure 26. Impact of FCR on the FSE Rate and AA Rate 
 
 
Figure 27. Impact of CFDR on the FSE Rate and AA Rate 
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Figure 28. Impact of FIR on the FSE Rate and AA Rate 
 
 
Figure 29. Impact of KFAR on the FSE Rate and AA Rate 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter started with a definition of the key measures of performance (MOP) 
and continued with the development of a designed experiment. The DOE was built as a 
3x3x3 full factorial design and all possible combinations of the three factors were 
replicated for 30 times through the simulation model. Then, ANOVA analyses were 
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conducted to investigate the effects of the factors on the MOPs. Additionally, some 
further analyses were conducted to examine the individual impacts of the PHM’s sub-
variables. Therefore, it was demonstrated that all factors were significantly influential on 
the MOPs.  The next chapter summarizes the research and gives recommendations for 
further studies. 
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V. Conclusions and Recommendations 
Introduction 
Previous chapters described the research topic, provided related literature reviews, 
explained the simulation model, defined the MOPs and critical factors, and analyzed the 
model outputs. This chapter summarizes the overall research, explains the results and 
gives recommendations for future research. 
Research Summary  
This research investigated the sortie generation process of sixteen F-35 aircraft 
under an autonomic logistics system at a notional base in Turkey. For this purpose, a 
discrete event simulation model of the sortie generation process was built in Arena® 
software. The key parts of the model were developed in view of the most recent practices 
regarding the F-35 and its logistics system.  
Based on the literature researches and expert views, the aircraft availability rate 
and flying scheduling effectiveness rate were determined as the key measure of 
performance (MOP) for the sortie generation process. PHM level, reliability growth rate, 
and learning curve rate were chosen as the critical factors potentially affecting these 
measures. Then, a 3x3x3 full factorial experiment was designed to analyze the simulation 
outputs. The simulation run length was determined as five years (1825 days) of 24-hour 
operations and each of the 27 scenarios were replicated 30 times. Simulation outputs 
were imported to JMP® software and ANOVA analysis was conducted to see the 
possible cause and effect relationships between factors and MOPs.   
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Research Conclusion 
The literature reviews indicated that the AL concept has been a popular research 
subject since the first introduction of the F-35. However, most prior studies investigated 
the AL concept from a notional basis due to a lack of real world data.  
 Initial delivery of the F-35s will be made to Turkey in the near future. However, 
official reports show that ALIS is still far from achieving the desired level of PHM 
functionality. Presently, the prognostic capability of the PHM system is not functional, 
and diagnostic capability is functional only with serious malfunctions. Keeping these 
realities in mind, this study aimed to explain sortie generation process of the F-35 using 
actual data.  
For this purpose, critical factors were determined and their potential impacts on 
the sortie generation process of the F-35 were examined in term of AA rate and FSE rate. 
The relationship between critical factors and MOPs were analyzed through ANOVA.  
The ANOVA results in Chapter 4 showed that all factors and their possible 
interactions had statistically significant impact on the AA rate. The lowest AA rate was 
obtained as 49.06% at the PHM1-RGR1-LCR1 treatment, when all factors were at their 
low levels.  The highest AA rate was achieved as 76.26% at PHM3-RGR3-LCR3 
treatment, when all factors were set to their high levels.  
Also, all factors were statistically significant on the FSE rate. However, there 
were not significant differences between some of their interactions. When the PHM level 
was increased from PHM2 to PHM3, changes in the RG rate and LC rate did not 
significantly affect the FSE rate. Parallel to this finding, the highest FSE rate was 
achieved as 80.24% at PHM2-RGR3-LCR3 treatment, when PHM level was medium, 
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and other factors were high. The lowest FSE rate was realized as 67.63% at PHM1-
RGR1-LCR1 treatment, when all factors were at their low values.   
Another important finding of the research was on the PHM. The PHM composite 
factor appeared as the statistically most significant predictor variable within the model. 
While four of the PHM sub-variables had statistically significant impact on the MOPs at 
all levels, the MFHBFA (Mean Flight Hours Between False Alarms) had a small 
statistically significant effect on the MOPs.  Therefore, it may be concluded that the 
current level of the MFHBFA (which is 170 hours) is reasonably good for critical 
failures.  The potential gains from the improvement of the MFHBFA are relatively 
smaller than the potential gains from other sub-variables. 
Recommendations for Further Study 
While building the simulation model, some important assumptions and limitations 
were defined. Investigating them offers potential to improve this research in many ways.  
First, some parts of the model were developed using other aircraft’s data due to 
the lack of real-world F-35 data. Future researches may attempt to obtain real F-35 data 
and update the associated parts of the model accordingly. 
Second, this research only investigated mission critical failures and false positives 
within the sortie generation process. Additionally, the PHM system’s prognostic 
capability was not modeled; since it was not functional at the time this research was 
conducted.  Adding other failure types, false negatives and prognostic capability into the 
model may help it to produce more realistic outputs. 
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Third, analyzing the supply activities was beyond the scope of this study. 
However, the supply process is as important as maintenance in generating sorties. 
Moreover, the AL system aims to change and improve the supply activities considerably. 
Therefore, analyzing the sortie generation process from a supply standpoint may provide 
benefits for the decision makers in the supply area.  
Fourth, all resources were assumed to have infinite capacity in the model. 
Therefore, queuing did not occur and so queuing effects on the sortie generation process 
were not analyzed. Adding equipment and human resources into the model and 
investigating the impacts of the resource levels on the MOPs may produce beneficial 
outputs for the decision makers in the equipment and personnel management areas. 
Next, reliability growth and learning curves were two important phenomena 
embedded into the model logic. While the reliability growth rate was calculated based on 
actual F-35 data, the learning curve rate was defined as an assumption. Future researchers 
may focus on these concepts more deeply and update the model according to actual data 
when available. 
Finally, while conducting this study, the researcher was not able to visit F-35 
bases and review the overall sortie generation process in the field.  Also, accessing F-35 
field experts was problematic. Making field visits and interviewing with logistics 
personnel would make great contributions to the research. In particular, the modelling 
part could be more closely aligned to actual operations. We strongly recommend future 
researchers to make field visits to the F-35 bases, before building the simulation model.  
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Appendix A: Normality Test Results 
 
Figure 30. Shapiro-Wilk Test Results for the Residuals of FSE Rate 
 
 
Figure 31. Shapiro-Wilk Test Results for the Residuals of AA Rate 
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Appendix B: Tests of the ANOVA Assumptions 
 
Figure 32. Shapiro-Wilk Test Results for FSE Rate (Normality) 
 
 
Figure 33. Shapiro-Wilk Test Results for AA rate (Normality) 
 
 
Figure 34. Residual Plot of the FSE Rate (Constant Variance) 
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Figure 35. Residual Plot of the AA Rate (Constant Variance) 
 
 
Figure 36. Overlay Plot of the FSE Rate’s Residuals (Independence) 
 
 
Figure 37. Overlay Plot of the AA Rate’s Residuals (Independence) 
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 Appendix C: Tukey Test Results for AA Rate 
Table 23. Tukey Tests for PHM Level, RG Rate, and LC Rate 
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Table 24. Tukey Test for Two-way Interactions of PHM Level and RG Rate 
 
 82 
Table 25. Tukey Test for Two-way Interactions of PHM Level and LC Rate 
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Table 26. Tukey Test for Two-way Interactions of RG Rate and LC Rate 
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Appendix D: Tukey Test Results for FSE Rate 
Table 27. Tukey Tests for PHM Level, RG Rate, and LC Rate 
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Table 28. Tukey Test for Two-way Interactions of PHM Level and RG Rate 
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Table 29. Tukey Test for Two-way Interactions of PHM Level and LC Rate 
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Table 30. Tukey Test for Two-way Interactions of RG Rate and LC Rate 
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Appendix E: ANOVA Results for MFHBFA 
Table 31. ANOVA of the MFHBFA vs. Maintenance Time  
 
 
Table 32. ANOVA of the MFHBFA vs. AA Rate  
 
 
Table 33. ANOVA of the MFHBFA vs. FSE Rate 
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Appendix F: ANOVA Results for FCR 
Table 34. ANOVA of the FCR vs. FSE Rate 
 
 
Table 35. ANOVA of the FCR vs. AA Rate 
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Appendix G: ANOVA Results for CFDR 
Table 36. ANOVA of the CFDR vs. FSE Rate 
 
 
Table 37. ANOVA of the CFDR vs. AA Rate 
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Appendix H: ANOVA Results for FIR 
Table 38. ANOVA of the FIR vs. FSE Rate 
 
 
Table 39. ANOVA of the FIR vs. AA Rate 
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Appendix I: ANOVA Results for KFAR 
Table 40. ANOVA of the KFAR vs. FSE Rate 
 
 
Table 41. ANOVA of the KFAR vs. AA Rate 
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